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Artistic Freedom and Government
Subsidy: Performing Arts Institutions in
the United States and West Germany
By ERIK STENBERG
Member of the Class of 1983
My colleague in Hamburg does contemporary opera after contempo-
rary opera and the press loves him, and he plays to empty houses,
and the state pays. But in America the state does not pay.'
Sir Rudolph Bing's statement, while not entirely accurate,2 reflects
a difference in attitude towards contemporary creativity between the
established performing arts institutions in West Germany and those in
the United States. Although an "overdose of ancestor worship"3 is
common to the repertory of the performing arts in both countries,4
West German institutions tend to more actively encourage the creation
and performance of contemporary works than their American
counterparts.
1. R. BING, 5000 NIGHTS AT THE OPERA 212 (1972). Bing was the general manager of
the New York Metropolitan Opera from 1950 to 1972. He questions whether the fcderal and
New York state governments should take over the Metropolitan Opera's entire budget dct-
Cit. "I would think they will want a decisive influence on the artistic policies. That is the
danger." R. BING, supra.
2. The statement is inaccurate because the average audience attendance was 87.1% of
house capacity during Rolf Liebermann's 14-year tenure as general manager of the
Hamburg State Opera. H. DAIBER, DEUTSCHES THEATER SEIT 1945 328 (1975). Further-
more, as discussed infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text, the United States government
"pays" by indirect subsidy via the tax laws.
3. P. HART, ORPHEUS IN THE NEW WORLD 417 (1973). The repertory of the perform-
ing arts today, particularly in music, demonstrates a marked prediliction for the small per-
centage of works which have survived as great works of art; hence the phrase "ancestor
worship." Id
4. See A. HXNSEROTH, ELEMENTE EINER INTEGRIERTEN EMPIRISC|EN THEATERFOR-
SCHUNG 148 (1976); R. SCHECHNER, PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS ON THE THEATRE 35 (1969).
In music, at least, this problem is common to practically all western nations. A. COPLAND,
MusIc AND IMAGINATON 17 (1952).
5. This is especially clear in the more abstract performing arts such as music and op-
era. Compare the repertory of the New York Metropolitan Opera with that of the Deutsche
Oper Berlin in W. DACE, PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL THEATER 46,52-55 (1978). There are
American composers who are forced to live abroad in countries such as West Germany in
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
The purpose of this Note is to examine the role of the government
in securing and maintaining artistic freedom in the performing arts in-
stitutions of these two countries. The primary basis for comparison will
be the ability of the artistic directors of performing arts institutions to
program the works they desire. 6  Given the disinclination often ex-
pressed in this country for government involvement in the arts, 7 the
Note will focus on the various advantages and disadvantages of a direct
subsidy approach as opposed to the emphasis on indirect government
support found in the United States.8
I. WEST GERMANY
A. Emphasis on Direct Support
West Germany has a long tradition of government patronage of
the arts. States and municipalities gradually acquired this role from
local sovereigns.' Today, the majority of West German performing arts
institutions are publicly owned, and many private organizations receive
sizeable subsidies.' 0
Government patronage in West Germany is decentralized, gener-
ally coming from bodies equivalent to state and municipal govern-
ments in the United States. I The amount of direct financial support to
public institutions is generally from seventy to ninety percent of their
order to get regular hearings of their works and thereby learn to write for the orchestra. E.
CARTER, in THE ORCHESTRAL COMPOSER'S POINT OF VIEW: ESSAYS ON TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY Music By THOSE WHO WROTE IT 41, 57 (R. Hines ed. 1970).
6. Although this is only one possible measure of artistic freedom, choice of repertory is
the most obvious and important one with respect to performing arts institutions. This Note
is more concerned with censorship of repertory, directly or indirectly, on artistic grounds
than with censorship for political reasons.
7. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 618, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. 618].
8. The Note does not address the issue, however, of the extent to which government
should support the arts in the first place, but rather the issue of how the government should
be supporting the arts if it is to be involved at all. Economists have long recognized that the
performing arts are inherently labor-intensive, with little capacity to increase productivity,
Long term economic trends have made government subsidy essential in the United States
just to maintain output in the arts, much less to expand it. D. NETZER, TIlE SUBSIDIZED
MUSE 28 (1978). See general,y W. BAUMOL & W. BOWEN, PERFORMING ARTS: THE Eco-
NOMIC DILEMMA (1966).
9. Wahl-Zieger, The Performing Arts and the Market: Anglo.American and German
Approaches to Theater and Orchestra in Market Economies, in ECONOMIC POLICY FOR TIlE
ARTS 224, 226 (1980).
10. G. ERBEL, INHALT UND AUSWIRKUNGEN DER VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN KUNST-
FREIHEITSGARANTIE 187 (Doe. Diss. K131n 1965).
11. F. DORIAN, COMMITMENT TO CULTURE 277 (1964).
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budgets, making these institutions probably the best endowed in the
world. 12
B. Constitutional Mandate to Support the Arts
While there were earlier attempts to legislatively guarantee free-
dom from governmental interference with the arts, t3 the 1919 Weimar
Constitution was the first document to contain an explicit provision:
"The arts, the sciences and their teaching are free. The state grants
them protection and takes part in their cultivation."'14 The extreme
politicization of the arts which occurred during the centralized Na-
tional-Socialist, or Nazi, regime severely emasculated and distorted this
constitutional provision.
t5
Article 5(3) of the current West German Constitution of 1949 pro-
vides simply that "[a]rt and science, research and teaching are free."' 6
On its face, and particularly following bad experiences under the Na-
zis, this provision can be read to preclude any government involvement
in the arts.'7 Although article 5(3) has been considered a reaction to the
Nazi experience,'" the commentators and courts overwhelmingly agree
that the provision does not imply total government abstinence from the
arts.19 One writer, relying on the legislative history of the 1949 consti-
tution, asserts that the provision is a conscious distillation of the Wei-
12. T. OPPE ANN, KULTURVERWALTUNGSRECHT 452 (1969); M. PATTERSON, GaoR-
MAN THEATRE TODAY 5 (1976). See W. DACE, supra note 5, at 77-82, for specific subsidy
statistics on a number of West German institutions.
13. W. KNIEs, SCHRANKEN DER KUNSTFREIHEIT ALS VERFASSUNGSRECIITLICHES
PROBLEM 209 (1967).
14. WEIMARER VERFASSUNG Art. 142. See T. MAULNZ, G. DODJo, R. HERZOO, & R.
SCHOLZ, KoMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ [hereinafter cited as T. MAUNz] 5-103 (looseleaf
1977).
15. See F. DORIAN, supra note 11, at 256-63, for a description of the Glelchschaltung,
the totalitarian control of the arts to serve Nazi politics. See also W. KNIEs, Jupra note 13,
at 192; Rockwell, Music Under Hitler, OPERA NEWS, Jan. 15, 1972, at 8, who interestingly
notes a similarity between the anti-modernism of the centralized Nazi cultural bureaucracy
and contemporary denunciations of cultural snobism by American politicians--all form
part of the same communally-inspired anti-intellectualism." Id at 10.
16. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 5 (W. Ger.), 3. The German word for this document,
Grundgesetz, literally means "Basic Law." "1949 constitution" will be used herein to pre-
vent confusion concerning the function of this document. Note that the West German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court has found that for purposes of constitutional analysis, artistic
expression is not a subcategory of other speech, which is provided for separately under art. 5,
para. 1. See infra note 42.
17. G. ERBEL, supra note 10, at 174.
18. Id at 175; W. KNIES, supra note 13, at 194.
19. G. ERBEL, supra note 10, at 174; W. KNiEs, supra note 13, at 213; T. OPPERMANN,
supra note 12, at 442, 454. See also infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
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mar Constitution provision, as the entire basic rights section of the
modem constitution is shorter than that of the old one.20 Another ra-
tionale is based on the concept of decentralization, or federalism, em-
bodied in the 1949 constitution. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to
provide for the federal government's involvement with the arts because
the existing state constitutions already allowed for government sup-
port.21 Finally, the commentators cite practical reasons to justify the
permissibility of government involvement. Private support following
World War II would have been impossible given the widespread eco-
nomic chaos,22 and without government aid there would have been a
break in the development of German art.23 In addition, post-war com-
petition from the expanding technology of reproduction and dissemina-
tion of all forms of art has made the withdrawal of government support
increasingly difficult.24
Beyond merely finding government support of the arts to be per-
missible, the West German Federal Constitutional Court25 has inter-
preted article 5(3) as dictating a positive obligation of the government
not only to protect, but also to promote the arts. This extraction of a
constitutional mandate to support the arts has its roots in the older con-
cept of the Kulturstaat,26 in which the state, as representative of the
community, provides cultural leadership.27
The Hochschule decision,28 for example, involved a determination
by the Federal Constitutional Court that some internal decision-mak-
ing processes of a state university did not comply with article 5(3) of
20. W. KNIEs, supra note 13, at 213.
21. F. DORIAN, supra note 11, at 268; W. KNIES, supra note 13, at 213; T. OPPERMANN,
supra note 12, at 444 n.24. G. ERBEL, SUpra note 10, at 136, contains a detailed discussion of
the applicable state (Land) constitutional provisions. These provisions are generally similar
to that of the 1919 Weimar (Federal) Constitution, supra note 14.
22. T. OPPERMANN, supra note 12, at 442.
23. G. ERBEL, supra note 10, at 175.
24. W. KNIEs, supra note 13, at 205.
25. This court is roughly equivalent to the United States Supreme Court in constitu-
tional matters. See generally Benda, Constitutional Jurisdiction in West Germany, 19 COLUM,
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1981).
26. A Kulturstaat is literally a "cultured" or "civilized state."
27. For historical background, see generally 0. JuNo, ZUM KULTURSTAATSBEORIFF 65-
68 (1976). In the 1949 constitution, this concept is embodied in the basic right to education,
the autonomy of art and science, and the principle of the welfare state (Sozialstoat), T.
MAUNz, supra note 14, at 5-102. The concept should not be confused with a Staatskuitur, or
official state culture. Reuhl, Kulturstaatlichkeit im Grundgesetz, 10 JURISTENZEITUNO 321,
321 (1981).
28. Judgment of May 29, 1973, Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG], 35 EUT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 79.
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the 1949 constitution.29 It was found necessary to modify the univer-
sity's decison-making apparatus by granting the faculty a voting major-
ity over other groups, such as the student body, to ensure the faculty's
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of scientific inquiry. In reaching
this conclusion, the court stated:
[Article 5(3)] is based on the key function which furnishes scientific
freedom with both self-realization of the individual and development
of society as a whole. This value decision does not only mean the
renunciation of state intervention in the previously distinguished
sphere of science; it includes much more the responsibility of the
state, which understands itself as a Kuturstaat, to uphold the idea of
scientific freedom and participate in its realization, and obligates the
state to organize its actions for this positively-this means protection
and promotion to prevent an undermining of this guarantee of
freedom.3°
The court made clear that the state is obligated to provide institutions
capable of fuilfilling this function.3'
Soon after the Hochschule decision, the court had the opportunity
to reiterate its interpretation of article 5(3) with regard to the arts in a
case involving the taxation of a record company.32 It was stated as a
mere preliminary matter that "[a]s an objective value decision for the
freedom of the arts [article 5(3)] provides the state, which understands
itself in the setting of goals also as a Kulturstaat, with the duty to main-
tain and promote a free artistic life."
'33
These judicial statements comport closely with the attitude of
modem German legal commentators. According to one writer, the
government is a better patron of the arts with respect to artistic freedom
than society, which is composed of many strong, one-sided forces:
"[T]he arts in the mass democracy of today, whose tendency towards
harmonizing leveling in pluralistic compromise is becoming more
prominent, needs protection more likely from society than from the
state."34 Thus, the government has a duty to enable the artist "to find
his development in the individual artistic striving after his own set of
29. The opinion analyzes the same constitutional provision under discussion and is
structurally applicable to the arts. T. MAuNZ, supra note 14, at 5-101; 0. JuNG, supra note
27, at 69 n.44.
30. 35 BVerfGE at 114.
31. Id at 115.
32. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1974, BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 321. This case is discussed in
greater detail later in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 75-79.
33. 36 BVerfGE at 331.
34. T. OPPERMANN, supra note 12, at 443.
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artistic rules" and to protect him from the "taste-flattening tendencies
of the modem mass democracy. ' 35 More succinctly, these statements
recognize that the arts do not function with optional freedom in the
marketplace. The presence of a multiplicity of donors does not remedy
this situation, according to another writer, because artists and institu-
tions compete for donors, not vice versa. Private donors as a group
therefore exercise "commercial censorship."
36
The President of the Federal Constitutional Court has written that
the concept of the positive government obligation to protect and pro-
mote fundamental rights, such as the artistic freedom guaranteed by
article 5(3), is a "very significant development" in West German consti-
tutional law.37 Such rights, he continued, "are not of great value in and
of themselves because before they have any independent legal signifi-
cance it is necessary for the state to implement them by means of af-
firmative. . . programs.""
C. General Limitations on Government Involvement
The most influential case concerning the freedom of the arts in
West Germany is the Mephisto decision.39 The case involved a private
suit for defamation which alleged that a novel about a corrupt actor
who had been successful during the Nazi period defamed the memory
of a real actor.4" The Federal Constitutional Court agreed with this
claim, holding that the novelist's constitutional freedom of artistic ex-
pression may be limited by his subject's constitutional right to human
dignity.
4'
In reaching this conclusion, the court expressed a number of im-
portant principles regarding the freedom of the arts.42 The guarantee
of artistic freedom in article 5(3), according to the court, is composed of
two essential norms:43 a subjective right which protects the individual
35. Id. at 454.
36. Wahl-Zieger, supra note 9, at 228.
37. Benda, New Tendencies in the Development of Fundamental Rights in the Federal
Republic of Germany, I 1 J. MAR. PRAC. & PROC. 1, 6 (1977). This article also discusses some
other recent cases where similar principles have been announced.
38. Id at 9.
39. Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, BVerfG, 30 BVerfGE 173.
40. This case is discussed in Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the United
States and the Federal Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 689-90 (1980).
41. GG art. 1 (W. Ger.).
42. It should be noted that the court did not find freedom of the arts to be a sub-cate-
gory of freedom of expression, which is provided for separately in article 5(1) of the 1949
constitution. 30 BVerf at 191.
43. Id at 188.
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from the state,44 and an objective value decision (objective Wertent-
scheidung) regulating the relationship of art as a whole to the state.45
These norms protect both artistic creative activity and the performance
and dissemination of the work.46 The court further stated:
The meaning and purpose of the basic right of Article 5 is above all
to keep processes, modes of behavior, and decisions based on the
inherent laws of art and determined by aesthetic considerations free
from every interference by public authorities. The manner in which
the artist encounters reality and shapes events that he experiences in
this encounter may not be prescribed for him if the process of artistic
creation is to develop freely. The "rightness" of his attitude towards
reality can only be decided by the artist himself. In this respect, the
guarantee of artistic freedom signifies a prohibition against influenc-
ing methods, contents, and tendencies of artistic activity, particularly
against restricting the sphere of artistic creativity or prescribing gen-
erally binding rules for this creative process. 47
The autonomy of the arts, continued the court, is guaranteed "without
reservation."
48
The Mephisto opinion reveals that article 5(3) of the 1949 constitu-
tion functions to restrain the Kulturstaat from developing a Staatskul-
tur, or official state culture. Censorship, of course, is clearly
precluded.49 The government is also prohibited from "fixing" artistic
trends.5 0 Further clarification of how the autonomy of the arts is
achieved requires analyzing public performing arts institutions sepa-
rately from private organizations.
D. Public Institutions-An "Institutional Guarantee"
Publicly owned performing arts institutions generally receive well
44. See also Benda, supra note 37, at 6.
45. The court remarked, in clear reference to the Nazi period, that not extending the
guarantee of artistic freedom from the individual's subjective right to such an objective
value decision would severely hamper constitutional protection of the arts. 30 BVerfGE at
189. See also W. KNixus, supra note 13, at 178, who calls this the "super-personal" aspect of
the guarantee of artistic freedom.
46. 30 BVerfGE at 189.
47. Id at 190.
48. Id at 191.
49. See T. MAUNZ, supra note 14, at 5-104; W. KNIES, upra note 13, at 214 n.18; T.
OPPERMANN,supra note 12, at 454; Kewenig, Theater undStaat, 58 ARCHIV FOR URHEIER-,
FiLM-, FUNK-, UND THEATERRECHT [UFITA] 91, 92 (1970). But see infra note 64.
50. See T. MAun1z, supra note 14, at 5-142; W. KNIEs, supra note 13, at 214 n.18; T.
OPPERMANN, sulra note 12, at 444; Kewenig, .upra note 49, at 103; Stiller, KunsfreiheiI und
Gleichheitsgebot bei staatlicher Kunstfdrderung, 60 UFITA 171, 183 (1971).
19831
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over half of their financial support directly from the government.5t
West German legal scholars write of an "institutional guarantee" of
artistic freedom52 to ensure the autonomy of the artistic leadership
within these organizations. In public performing arts institutions, an
example of an "institutional guarantee" is the office of the Intendant, or
general manager of a public theater or opera house.
The Intendant is generally selected by the city or state Minister of
Culture (Kultusminister) with authority over the institution in question,
in cooperation with the respective city council or state legislative com-
mittee.5 3 In some cities recent changes have democratized the selection
process by utilizing the opinions of the performers who must work with
the new Intendant, and even the opinions of the institution's audi-
ence.54 The selection of both the conductor and manager of the Berlin
Philharmonic, for instance, is made by the orchestra members, al-
though the city council possesses a veto power which has rarely been
exercised. 5
Under the Uniform Intendant Contract of the German State Stage
Association, 56 the Intendant is free to determine the repertory of his
theater within the budget allowed for the year. Since the Intendant
alone is responsible for the artistic results of the theater under this com-
monly used contract, government officials can neither force specific
repertory onto the program nor veto the Intendant's repertory or per-
sonnel decisions.57 There is some question regarding whether a con-
tract with excessive government control over an Intendant violates
article 5(3) of the 1949 constitution. Those commentators who address
this question agree that it would be unconstitutional, although they dif-
fer as to the rationale for this conclusion. 58 At least one unreported
51. R. DTJNNWALD, DIE RECHTSSTELLUNG DES THEATERINTENDANTEN 25 (Doe. Diss.
K6in 1964). The majority of institutions in West Germany are publicly owned and oper-
ated. G. ERBEL, supra note 10, at 187.
52. T. MAUNZ, supra note 14, at 5-101; Kewenig, supra note 49, at 102.
53. Hutton, Decision-Making in West German Theaters, 7 PERF. ARTS REV. 526, 529
(1977).
54. See id The selection of the Intendant may be at the mercy of local politicians in
places which have not democratized their procedures. R. DONNWALD, supra note 51, at 50;
H. DAIBER, supra note 2, at 276.
55. H. TAUBMAN, THE SYMPHONY ORCHESTRA ABROAD 39 (1970).
56. See R. DONNWALD, supra note 51, at 42. An English translation of the contract
appears in Hutton, supra note 53, at 546-51. The German State Stage Association (Deutscher
Biihnenverein) is an association composed of the state theaters.
57. R. DUNNWALD, supra note 51, at 50, 52.
58. G. ERBEL, supra 10, at 188, says it would violate the objective value decision rcgu-
lating the relationship of art as a whole to the state. See supra note 45 and accompanying
text. Kewenig, supra note 49, at 103, rejects this view but finds a violation of the Intendant's
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decision indicates that the Intendant is to be considered the highest au-
thority in all artistic matters of the theater and is not subject to any
government control or direction. 9
The office of the Intendant is an "institutional guarantee" for the
freedom of the arts because it attempts to insulate the artistic direction
of public performing arts institutions from the state by placing its con-
trol in the hands of an individual with great expertise in the performing
arts. The power hierarchy in German theaters is not without its critics,
of course, especially since government officials do wield considerable
power.60 Government control over the institution's budget, for exam-
ple, may be influential.61 Furthermore, the commentators indicate that
government authorities possess considerable discretion to fire an Inten-
dant.62 West Germans consider public control over theaters to be a
virtue, however, because the public possesses ultimate control over pol-
iticians and bureaucrats who attempt to influence the arts.63
Those repertory disputes which have been made public have gen-
erally involved political theater, as opposed to attempted censorship
based on differences in artistic opinion." Others have noted that com-
promises are often reached in repertory disputes, and thus the disputes
are not publicized.65  But when covert attempts are made to influence
individual, subjective right to artistic freedom. W. KNns, supra note 13, at 203, expressly
does not answer the question, stating instead that a solution would not derive from the 1949
constitution, but from the nature of the office of the Intendant.
59. See R. D0ONWALD, supra note 51, at 58, for excerpts from this 1955 Dtsseldorf
labor court case. H. DAIBER, supra note 2, at 276, also discusses this decision.
60. H. DAIBER, supra note 2, at 292. The former Intendant of the Hamburg State Opera
notes that his role sometimes involved acting as a "shock absorber between the public and
the state." R. LIEBERMANN, OPERNJAHRE 210 (1979).
61. T. OPPERMANN, supra note 12, at 456; Kewenig, supra note 49, at 107.
62. Kewenig, supra note 49, at 107, indicates that an Intendant may be fired at any time.
R. DONtWALD, supra note 51, at 5 1, suggests that an Intendant may be fired only if artistic
quality is poor. Hutton, supra note 53, at 532 n.7, maintains that Intendants' contracts are
generally renewed as long as the repertory is well-rounded and within budget.
63. Wahl-Zieger, supra note 9, at 228; G. ERBEL, supra note 10, at 178.
64. A full discussion of direct censorship for political reasons is beyond the scope of this
Note, in which the emphasis is on censorship based on artistic taste. Nevertheless, two high-
ly publicized instances involved plays, by Bertoldt Brecht and Albert Camus, whose per-
formances ostensibly would have encroached on sensitive foreign policy matters. See G.
ERBEL, supra note 10, at 190; Kewenig, supra note 49, at 101. Rolf Liebermann, the former
Intendant of the Hamburg State Opera, discusses a delay in the performance of an opera
whose libretto was written by Brecht, an East German. The pressure on the Intendant re-
sulted from outcries from the performers and the public over the construction of the Berlin
Wall. The city government was in favor of performance, which occurred a year later. R.
LIEBERMANN, supra note 60, at 266-67.
65. Kewenig, supra note 49, at 101. This might explain the lack of reported litigation
concerning the constitutional powers of an Intendant.
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repertory, unjustifiably fire an Intendant, or restrict a theater's budget,
such events tend to be more publicized than under the American sys-
tem of exclusively private institutions, because the public has a direct
interest in the running of its own theaters.66 At least some West
Germans find such a system of open and direct government support
preferable to the American system of predominantly indirect subsidy,
in which there is no control over those private individuals in power.67
E. Direct Subsidy to Private Organizations
Private performing arts organizations also receive substantial
direct financial assistance from various government bodies in West
Germany. While this is of secondary importance, it furnishes an op-
portunity to compare West German direct subsidy to private groups
and artists with the United States direct subsidy system, as represented
by the National Endowment for the Arts.
68
Under article 5(3) of the 1949 constitution, there is no government
obligation to ensure the existence of a private performing arts organiza-
tion corresponding to the duty to provide public institutions which se-
cure the freedom of the arts.69  There is considerable doctrinal
confusion among the courts and commentators regarding the precise
nature of the government's discretion under article 5(3) in funding pri-
vate organizations and artists.70 This confusion is compounded by the
application of the equal treatment clause found in article 3 of the 1949
66. See L. LEIss, KUNST IM KONFLIKT 399 (1971), for an example of a State Minister of
Culture who had a contemporary ballet, composed by Werner Egk, removed from the repcr-
tory of a public institution. The event was highly publicized, and the Minister was eventual-
ly fired.
67. One writer puts it quite bluntly:
Naturally one finds glittering orchestras in San Francisco and New York and Bos-
ton. These orchestras there are not infrequently supported by rich private persons.
These rich private persons sometimes have certain programming ideas, to which a
German chief conductor or general music director would certainly not submit,
even if they came from the Minister of Culture himself.
Kaiser, Chance und Problem bffentlicher Fdrderung, DAS ORCHESTER 625, 626 (1981).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 118-55.
69. T. MAUNz, supra note 14, at 5-143. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
70. Most sources favor qualitative selection in making funding decisions, See T.
MAUNZ, supra note 14, at 5-113, 5-118; Stiller, supra note 50, at 175; Nordemann, Kunst und
Subvention, in FESTSCHRIFT FOR WERNER WEBER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAO 217, 219 (1974);
Judgment of Apr. 29, 1966, Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerwG], 50 UFITA 309 (1967).
But see W. KNIES, supra note 13, at 217, 224.
The constitutional concept of "art" is highly disputed. T. MAUNZ, supra note 14, at 5-
111. One commentator asserts that the state may distinguish art from non-art. Id at 5-117.
But see Judgment of Feb. 24, 1971, BVerfG, 30 BVerfGE 173, discussed supra notes 39-48,




In one case,72 a traveling private theater which catered to East
German refugees and received a partial subsidy for years was cut off
from funding because of government budget difficulties. Unless the
plaintiff could demonstrate unequal treatment in relation to other thea-
ters in violation of article 3, no right to a subsidy could be found. The
court stated that the government "has to promote the arts wherever and
however it finds them. A valuation does not belong in principle.' 73 No
violation of the equal treatment clause of the 1949 constitution was
found, however, because of "material" differences between the plain-
tiff's theater and the six state theaters in question. These differences
included the special repertory of the plaintiff which did not cater to the
general public, unlike the state theaters, and the fact that the plaintiff
was a touring theater. Since the six state theaters were thus not com-
peting with the plaintiff, no violation of the principle of free competi-
tion embodied in the equal treatment clause of article 3 was found.
74
The "valuation" of which the court had spoken was obviously intended
to mean as among "material equals." The opinion mentioned one
practicality which may most readily explain its holding: it would not
make sense, according to the court, that a private theater would have
the right to receive a subsidy while the public theaters would be forced
to close down. 75
Similar reasoning has been applied to indirect support through
preferential tax treatment. In one case before the Federal Constitu-
tional Court,76 the complainant record company argued that the consti-
tutional mandate for government support of the arts which the court
had developed in its decisions77 obligated the government to treat all
segments of the arts community equally. This would have required a
lowering of the company's tax burden. The court found such a conclu-
sion unwarranted, but carefully limited its holding to the situation at
tic freedom by limiting the concept of art would violate the constitutional provision. Id. at
191.
71. GG art. 3, 1 1 provides: "All persons are equal before the law." See generall ,
Stiller, supra note 50.
72. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1968, Oberverwaltungsgericht [OVG] Llneburg, 21 DEUT-
SCHES VERWALTuNGSBLATT [DVBI] 875 (1969).
73. Id at 876. Compare supra note 70; infra note 85.
74. 21 DVBI at 877.
75. Id at 875. This reasoning is somewhat overextended since, at most, the public thea-
ters would have to cut back on programming, not close down.
76. Judgment of Mar. 5, 1974, BVerfG, 36 BVerfGE 321. This case is also discussed
supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 25-33.
19831
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
hand by stating that the government possessed wide enough discretion
to take the financial success of the record company into account.78 The
court justifed this holding by remarking that the complainant's thesis
would even injure the state's mandate to ensure the freedom of the
arts, in that on the one side it would hardly contribute anything to-
wards artistic production, in quality or quantity, and on the other
side would deprive the truly needy arts institutions of the always re-
strictedly available state support.
79
In other words, the state would forego needed tax revenues from a
financially healthy medium that does not produce art, but merely re-
produces it.
80
The preceding cases demonstrate that West German arts organiza-
tions have the same constitutional right to freedom of artistic expres-
sion, but not necessarily a constitutional right to the same financial
support. German legal scholars recognize the potential danger of vest-
ing discretion for funding decisions in the government, 81 but the danger
is at least partially offset by the availability of administrative 82 and ju-
dicial83 review. A number of cases demonstrate this assertion. In one
case,84 a visual artist was excluded from a list from which artists were
78. 36 BVerfGE at 332.
79. Id at 333.
80. One writer has developed the reasoning of the court's opinion, which essentially
involves equalizing market imbalances brought about by technology, into an "interference
model," in which the government interferes exclusively to promote new and weak forms of
art. 0. JUNG, supra note 27, at 72.
81. W. KNIES, supra note 13, at 227, is particularly concerned with possible abuse of
discretion in this area, which explains why he opposes qualitative judgments by the govern-
ment. See supra note 70.
82. West Germany enacted a new Federal Law on Administrative Procedure in 1976.
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz, 1976 Bundesgesetzblatt 11253 (W. Ger.). See also Pakuscher,
The Use of Discretion in German Law, 44 U. CHi. L. REV. 94, 108 (1976). Besides requiring
disclosure in detail of the reasons for a particular decision, pertinent records must be made
available to a rejected applicant for his inspection. Id at 109. Compare Wu v. Keeney, 384
F. Supp. 1161, 1166-67 (D.D.C. 1974), where an unsuccessful applicant for a grant from the
National Endowment for the Humanities (the companion foundation to the National En-
dowment for the Arts) was unable to judicially discover the statements of the experts used in
denying his application.
83. West German courts are competent to review cases involving abuse of discretion in
the arts subsidy area. See Judgment of Jan. 28, 1966, BVerwG, 23 ENTSCIIflIDUNO1N DES
BUtDESVERWALTUNGSGERICHT [BVerwGE] 194, 200. Compare the following statement
from Advocates for Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976), discussed infra text accompanying notes 145-56: "Given this focus on the
comparative merit of literary and artistic works equally entitled to first amendment protec-
tion as 'speech,' courts have no particular institutional competence warranting case-by-case
participation in the allocation of funds."
84. Judgment of Feb. 9, 1972, OVG Lfineburg, 10 DVBI 393 (1972).
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selected for work on government buildings. The court found that a
qualitative, subjective evaluation was necessary for the selection pro-
cess,85 but found arbitrariness in violation of the equal treatment clause
of article 3 of the 1949 constitution because of the admittedly different
standards used for the two methods of getting on the list.8 6 The case
additionally reveals one of the administrative safeguards used in the
selection process: the plaintiff was given the opportunity to appeal his
first denial to a second, different jury of experts for an independent
evaluation of his artistic ability.
87
In another case,8" the plaintiff, who ran a private musical theater,
was notified after she was contractually liable to actors and other per-
sonnel that a needed subsidy which she had received for a number of
years would not be renewed. She claimed a form of detrimental reli-
ance. The court stated that normally one cannot rely on the continua-
tion of a subsidy, but here a relationship of trust had developed
between the plaintiff and the government official involved, making the
government potentially liable.89
F. Other Features of the West German System
The decentralized nature of the West German system of govern-
ment support to the arts embodies a crucial strength. States and munic-
ipalities are the primary patrons, which help prevent conformity to any
national artistic trends and standards. Local support thus "conserves
culture and in so doing it preserves individualism; and individualism
means, or at least can mean, freedom." 90 Since West Germans recog-
nize that any bureaucracy can lead to conformity,91 strong federalism
reduces the necessary bureaucracy to somewhat more manageable state
and municipal levels.92
Another important safeguard against politicization of performing
arts institutions in West Germany is the competition between public
85. See supra note 70.
86. 10 DVBI 397. The methods were by competition and by merely exhibiting one's
work at an annual art show.
87. Id at 394.
88. Judgment of May 21/22, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof in Zivilsachen [BGHZ], 9 JuRt-
STISCHE RUNDSCHAU 387 (1975).
89. Id at 389.
90. Benda, supra note 37, at 4.
91. T. OPPERMANN, supra note 12, at 447.
92. Even greater decentralization, by reducing the already minimal federal involvement
and increasing cooperation between state and municipal governments, has been advocated
as a way of stimulating more cultural variety in West Germany. Seegenerally Pappermann,
Grundziige eines kommunalen Kulturveifassungsrechts, 17/18 DVBI 701 (1980).
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and private organizations. Ideally, the public can observe when a state
institution begins to promote certain messages over others and compare
what it is getting for its tax money by attending performances of private
organizations.93 The German system, however, creates an unfortunate
dilemma because the heavily subsidized public institutions charge far
less than the actual production cost for admission, both to justify the
amount of subsidy and to encourage attendance at performances. Pri-
vate organizations are thus unable to compete with public institutions
because they must pay for the cost of production through ticket reve-
nues, and are occasionally forced to close.94 This situation has pro-
voked strong criticism from one legal scholar,95 although the courts
have not addressed the issue.
96
Finally, the existence of strong, direct government financial sup-
port in West Germany does not necessarily preclude private patronage
of the performing arts. Such support has been used to fund experimen-
tal and less commercially viable projects that would normally not be
available because of budget considerations. 97 Private donations, more-
over, are recognized as indirect government support by West Germans,
because charitable contributions are tax-deductible. 98
II. UNITED STATES
A. Emphasis on Indirect Subsidy
There is no significant tradition of direct government support to
the performing arts in the United States.99 The charitable contribution
deduction in the Internal Revenue Codec ° is the primary form of sub-
93. Admittedly, the public institutions are generally larger, better funded, and well es-
tablished; however an outlet does exist for nongovernment funded expression.
94. This was the fate of the theater which was denied a subsidy in the ease discussed
supra text accompanying notes 72-75. Nordemann, supra note 70, at 221 n.27.
95. Nordemann, supra note 70, at 220-22.
96. It has been held that the equal treatment clause of art. 3 of the 1949 constitution
does not mandate market equality between public and private schools, Judgment of Sept.
22, 1967, BVerwG, 27 BVerwGE 360, 364.
97. R. LIEBERMANN, supra note 60, at 143. W. BAUMOL & W. BOWEN, supra note 8, at
372, are uncertain as to the effects of increasing government support on the level of private
contributions.
98. R. LIEBERMANN, supra note 60, at 143. The amount of charitable contributions
deductible for income tax purposes is significantly lower for individuals in West Germany
than in the United States. See H. GUMPEL, TAXATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC Or GER-
MANY 773 (2nd ed. 1969). Compare infra note 100.
99. See Neil, Nonprofit Arts Institutions: Local Needs and the National Interest, 10
CONN. L. REv. 562, 562-67 (1978).
100. Individuals are permitted to deduct up to 50% of their adjusted gross income as a
charitable contribution. This limit is 30% for long term capital gain property. IR.C.
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sidy to performing arts institutions in the United States.' 0' Though
often described as "private support," it is an indirect method of assist-
ance since the federal government loses potential tax revenues.
"0 2 It
has been estimated that using the budget of the National Endowment
for the Arts 0 3 alone to determine the amount of federal support under-
states the real amount of subsidy by at least a factor of four, because of
the considerable amount of tax deductible contributions made to the
arts every year.' °4
B. Decision Making in American Institutions
Performing arts institutions are generally organized in the United
States as private, non-profit corporations. 0 5 The board of trustees, or
directors, which hires and fires artistic management,"' 6 wields consider-
able power. Since members of the board are often selected on the basis
of the tax deductible contributions they have made to the institution'0 7
and on their ability to raise additional money,'"8 they are generally
drawn from the business and social elite.109 Those responsible for the
§ 170(b) (1980). Contributions in excess of these limits can be carried over for the succeed-
ing five years. I.R.C. § 170(d) (1980).
101. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 44; Price, State Arts Councils: Some 1tersfor a New
Agenda, 27 HASTINGS Li. 1183, 1202 (1976); A. TOFFLER, THE CULTURE CONSUMERS 187
(1964).
102. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1938); Surrey, Federal Income Tax
Reformn The VariedApproaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Govern-
mentalAssitance, 84 HARv. L. REV. 352, 384 (1970). This "tax expenditure" view of chari-
table contributions as a subsidy is not universally accepted, however. See general/)' GIVING
IN AMERICA, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBuc NEEDS
107-10 (1975). See also Price, supra note 101, at 1195 n.57, for additional citations to this
debate.
The grant of tax-exempt status to an institution also constitutes a form of government
support. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674-75 (1970). W. BAUMOL & W. BowEN,
supra note 8, at 353, note that tax exemptions, whether a subsidy or not, do not amount to
significant savings because virtually all performing arts organizations operate at a deficit.
103. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
104. Vandell & O'Hare, Indirect Government Aid to the Arts: The Tax Erpenditure in
Charitable Contributions, 7 PuB. FIN. Q. 162, 177 (1979), based on 1975 statistics. D.
NETZER, supra note 8, at 44, estimates the amount of this form of indirect subsidy to be at
least $400 million as of 1978.
105. ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION PANEL REPORT, THE PERFORMING ARTS: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS 150 (1965) [hereinafter cited as ROCKEFELLER REPORT]. See also Neil,
supra note 99, at 565, 568.
106. P. HART, supra note 3, at 471; ROCKEFELLER REPORT, supra note 105, at 150.
107. W. DACE, supra note 5, at 115.
108. P. HART, supra note 3, at 334, 479.
109. RK BING, supra note 1, at 134, mentions one chairman of the New York Metropoli-
tan Opera board whose primary interest in the opera was social. In addition, according to
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artistic direction of the organization, such as conductors or theater
managers, do not possess absolute authority regarding the artistic af-
fairs of the organization.' 10
Market pressures acutely affect the decision making process. The
reliance placed on a performing arts "market" stifles innovation and
experimentation"' through "commercial censorship" by audiences." 2
Donors often make contributions subject to conditions which are predi-
cated on their own tastes and desires. 1 3 Private foundations, for exam-
ple, have been criticized for being more philistine than government
agencies.' Nojudicial or administrative controls are available against
the ROCKEFELLER REPORT, supra note 105, at 151: "[P]eople about whom practically noth-
ing is known often are chosen to be trustees."
110. After discussing several of the conditions which contribute to the "maintenance of
artistic standards," including the audience/repertory problem, the ROCKEFELLER REPORT,
supra note 105, at 159 states: "Each of these conditions is to an extent controllable by trust-
ees and management, artistic and business. Each decision carries a price tag and each re-
quires judgment, knowledge, and taste, in order that proper decisions may be arrived at by
all concerned." Additional statements are also illuminating:
Too often the relationship between a board and the artistic director of an arts or-
ganization deteriorates into a squabble between traditionalists who "know what
they like" and artists who insist on pressing outward against the boundaries of the
usual. A certain amount of tension is undoubtedly healthy, but board members will
sacrifice some of the strength of their position-and the respect of their artist col-
leagues-if they do not bring to these discussions of aesthetic questions a degree of
knowledgeability and sophistication.
Id at 152 (emphasis added). P. HART, supra note 3, at 471, states that symphony boards do
not "refrain completely from concerning themselves with a conductor's musical program,"
R. LIEBERMANN, supra note 60, at 143-44, asserts that New York Metropolitan Opera do-
nors interfere with artistic plans because they pay for productions put on by their "favorite
toy." He states that he would not want to be the general manager of the Metropolitan Opera
because he would have "to run to every cocktail party to beg again for a few thousand
dollars," preferring instead to fight over his budget with a government finance minister. Id
at 142. There is little recourse available against a board of trustees which censors a work,
aside from the conductor or manager quitting the post and, assuming the contract allows for
artistic autonomy, suing for damages for breach of contract.
111. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 38; R. SCHECHNER, supra note 4, at 35.
112. Wahl-Zieger, supra note 9, at 228. "Only at its peril does an artistic director ignore
his audience's taste." ROCKEFELLER REPORT, supra note 105, at 159.
113. See supra note 109; see also P. HART, supra note 3, at 331. See R. BING, supra note
1, at 325, for a humorous example of this problem, in which a potential donor repeatedly
offered money to the Metropolitan Opera on the condition that his own work be performed.
In addition, artistic directors find that they must perform repertory which pleases their ma-
jor contributors in order to ensure later donations. A. TOFFLER, supra note 101, at 194,
114. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 38. See also P. HART, supra note 3, at 337. Some
foundations' funding policies tend to force reliance on the market by promoting new artistic
activities not supported by other donors in conjunction with not funding the recipient indefi-
nitely. R. SCHECHNER, supra note 4, at 17. A detailed discussion of private foundations is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally W. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS (1972).
Foundation support to the performing arts has been declining in recent years. R. BRUSTEIN,
[Vol, 6
Artistic Freedom
donors such as these," 5 although defenders of the system maintain that
the multiplicity of available sources of private funding compensates for
any pressure from potential donors."I6 As noted above, this is an un-
realistic view of the economics involved, because private donors as a
group exercise "commercial censorship."'"I7 The result is that the artis-
tic leadership of an American performing arts organization is relatively
restricted in the programming of repertory.
C. Direct Subsidy in the United States
In response to the increasing operating deficits in the arts,' 18 Con-
gress passed an Act which established the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA) in 1965,1' 9 finding that "encouragement and support of
. . . the arts, while primarily a matter for private and local initiative, is
also an appropriate matter of concern to the Federal Government."' 2 0
The NEA distributes grants, which are limited to no more than half of
the support of any one project for which aid is requested,' 2 ' to tax ex-
empt, nonprofit private groups. 122 Grants are also made directly to in-
dividual artists "of exceptional talent."'' The Act purports to
emphasize "American creativity and cultural diversity"' 24 and ex-
pressly prohibits government control over recipient arts organizations
CRITICAL MOMENTS, REFLECTIONS ON THEATRE AND SOCIETY 1973-1979, at 45-48 (1980).
Corporate support in 1976 was approximately two and one-half times the budget of the
National Endowment for the Arts, but most money is used to sponsor television programs
concerning the arts. This tends to "confirm a suspicion that much corporate support for the
arts tends to be a dignified form of institutional advertising, avoiding the hard-sell approach
of traditional sponsorship but retaining many of the same prohibitions." I.d at 48.
115. P. HART, supra note 3, at 331. Wahl-Zieger, supra note 9, at 228, states: "In spon-
soring art [private donors] can either grant freedom to the artists, or they can exert political
pressure-whichever they like."
116. D. NETZERSUpra note 8, at38; A. TOFFLER,supra note 101, at 202; H.R. 618,.'upra
note 7, at 23. This so-called "pluralism" argument maintains that such broad-based support
will secure artistic freedom. See D. FREEMAN, THE HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS
3 (1981).
117. See supra notes 34-36.
118. See supra note 8.
119. Act of Sept. 29, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-209, 79 Stat. 845 (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. §§ 951-960 (Supp. IV 1980)).
120. 20 U.S.C. § 951(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
121. I d § 954(e). This provision was designed to prevent the government from becom-
ing the primary patron of organizations, thereby dominating cultural expression. M.
STRAIGHT, TWIGS FOR AN EAGLE'S NEST, GOVERNMENT AND THE ARTS: 1965-1978, at 87
(1979). Between 1965 and 1978, a 10% to 15% level prevailed in grants to organizations,
which kept the NEA out of management and administrative problems. .d
122. 20 U.S.C. § 954(0 (1976).
123. Id § 954(c) (Supp. IV 1980).
124. Id § 954(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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or artists. 25 In addition, grants are made to independent state arts
agencies, most of which were set up in response to the creation of the
NEA, for disbursement locally. 2 6 The Act also created a National
Council on the Arts127 to advise and make recommendations regarding
funding decisions to the chairman of the NEA. 128 The chairman is not
bound by these recommendations. 129 The use, however, of panels of
arts experts appointed by the chairman to select grant recipients and
advise the Endowment has become prevalent and institutionalized.
30
In summary, the NEA essentially functions as a public foundation
with more safeguards against directly influencing the arts than private
foundations because of political restraints and the statutory prohibition
against its engaging in such activity. In both types of foundations,
however, determining who will receive assistance is discretionary.1
31 It
therefore cannot be seen as fundamentally altering the market oriented
process of choosing repertory in American performing arts institutions
discussed previously.
132
125. Id § 953(c), which states: "In the administration of this chapter no department,
agency, officer, or employee of the United States shall exercise any direction, supervision, or
control over the policy determination, personnel, or curriculum, or the administration or
operation of any school or other non-Federal agency, institution, organization, or
association."
126. Id § 954(g) (Supp. V 1981). The most important of the state arts agencies is that of
New York, which was established before the NEA and makes sizeable contributions of its
own, besides distributing NEA funds. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 94. By 1970, there were
statutory agencies in every state distributing their basic NEA grant plus additional state
funds in many instances. These independent agencies have pressed for greater involvement
in developing NEA programs and policies. M. STRAIGHT, supra note 121, at 93. Straight, a
former NEA administrator, laments the lack of coordination between the NEA and state
agencies because the latter grant funds above those given by the NEA to major arts institu-
tions, at the expense of smaller organizations. Id at 97. However, 20 U.S.C. § 953(c) pre-
cludes any NEA control over state arts agencies. See supra note 125.
127. The Council is composed of 26 private persons associated with the arts who are
appointed by the President for staggered six-year terms. 20 US.C. § 955(b), (c) (Supp. IV
1980).
128. The Chairman is appointed by the President for a four-year term. Id § 954(b)
(1976).
129. See Id § 955(f (Supp. V 1981).
130. Id § 959(a)(4) (Supp. V 1981), which authorizes the Chairman of the NEA "to
utilize from time to time, as appropriate, experts and consultants, including panels of experts
... " See H.R. REP. No. 1024, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4400 (1976); M. STRAIOHT, sapra
note 121, at 77. In 1973, 185 experts residing in 31 states were used by the NEA. Id at 77.
The panels tend to develop the Endowment's policies. Id at 80. Straight questions the
wisdom of using panels for determining excellence in the creative arts because the selection
is so subjective that it becomes arbitrary. He asserts that performers, on the other hand, may
be judged by somewhat more objective criteria. Id at 169.
131. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 37.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 105-117.
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Prior to passage of the Act, some legislators feared that the crea-
tion of the NEA would lead to censorship, excessive bureaucracy, and
mediocrity in the arts. 133 In practice, outright censorship by the NEA
or state agencies has been a rarity. 3 4 Excessive bureaucracy in the arts,
moreover, has "long been at work under private control," especially
with regard to fund-raising machinery. 35 Some legislators feared that
mediocrity would be fostered in the arts because they felt that decisions
would be made by committee and thus "contribute to a spirit of com-
promise and conservatism. .... Charges of mediocrity, however,
being particularly subjective in the area of contemporary creativity,
37
are difficult to refute. The NEA has been criticized for spreading its
funds too thin, for example, thereby promoting a lowering of stan-
dards.' 38 Nonetheless, the West German attitude that the government
must combat the compromise and conservatism of the private sector is
worthy of comparison here.
139
Relatively little criticism of the NEA has come from the arts com-
munity." There have been protests against the Endowment's refusal
to fund operating Costs, 14 1 a policy obviously designed to keep govern-
ment involvement in the internal affairs of organizations to a mini-
mum. Another writer asserts that the NEA places contemporary
creativity too low on its list of priorities. 42 Outside review panels,
133. H.R. 618, supra note 7, at 19-23.
134. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 36. But see infra text accompanying note 145.
135. P. HART, supra note 3, at 335, 350, 476.
136. A. TOFFLER, supra note 101, at 191, quoted in H.R. 618, supra note 7, at 21.
137. See, ag, M. STRAIGHT, supra note 121, at 169.
138. Mayer, Dark Prospects: The Arts in America, OPERA NEws, Jan. 11, 1975, at 15,
denouncing equal distribution to states; R. BRUSTEIN, supra note 114, at 50; W. BAUIMOL &
W. BowEN, supra note 8, at 375-76.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
140. For a sarcastic, destructively critical "expos6" of an alleged Orwellian conspiracy by
the government (primarily the NEA), business, and academia to create a new national cul-
ture, see M. MOONEY, THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE: CONNECTIONS AMONG ART, MONEY,
AND POLITICS (1980).
141. Neilsupra note 99, at 570. See also A. TOFFLER,supra note 101, at 200. Even with
such a policy, symphony boards in particular were reluctant to risk giving up any of their
power to the government, and did not apply for NEA funding until 1970. P. HART, supra
note 3, at 358.
142. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 74, 160. H.R. 618,supra note 7, at 24 (additional views
of Congressman Quie), contains the reasonable suggestion that NEA grants should be re-
stricted to institutions and organizations as opposed to individuals. Rather than having gov-
ernment money granted to individuals for use in undefined future performances, performing
arts institutions could select the artists and works they desire through commissions, competi-
tions, or artist-in-residence programs. Michael Straight, former Deputy Chairman of the
NEA, voices the similar opinion that matching funds be given to institutions.to commission
and perform new works, rather than give grants to individuals. This would thereby disperse
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formed to alleviate the effects of favoritism in the National Council due
to conflicts of interest, have also been recommended because the Coun-
cil is composed of persons in the arts who are serving temporarily and
who therefore tend to favor their own organizations.
43
The NEA has received scant criticism from the legal community as
well. The incorporation of basic administrative due process into the
Act has been advocated upon the premise that judicial review is ill-
suited for the protection of artists.'44 This criticism proved to be accu-
rate in the aftermath of Advocates for Arts v. Thomson. 4 In this case,
the Governor of New Hampshire vetoed a small grant of NEA funds
from the state arts agency to a literary magazine by means of his power
to authorize disbursement of the funds, which were held in the state
treasury. 146 The decision was made because the Governor found lan-
guage in a poem published in a previous issue of the magazine to be
filled with obscenities.1 47
The plaintiffs in Thomson restricted their attack on appeal to the
First Amendment. While the plaintiffs did not challenge the principle
of government funding for the arts, the First Circuit noted that this was
clearly permissible under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
First Amendment in Buckley v. Valeo.148 Rather, the plaintiffs claimed
that the funding decision in question constituted a prior restraint of
free expression because it was motivated by personal preference alone.
The court rejected this claim on the ground that the doctrine of prior
restraint acts only when the government restricts expression based on
its content.'49 Arts funding, according to the court, does not seek to
restrict speech "but rather to use public money to facilitate and en-
large" artistic expression.' 50 The court further stated:
and decentralize the patronage power of the Endowment. M. STRAIGHT, supra note 121, at
171.
143. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 194.
144. Comment, Media and the First Amendment in a Free Society, 60 GEo. L.J. 867, 1064
(1972). After discussing several potential legal remedies for censorship and the difficulties of
obtaining judicial relief, the author suggests subjecting any action by the NEA's Chairman
which is contrary to the National Council's recommendations to a two-thirds majority vote
by the Council, along with the addition of an appeals procedure for rejected applicants,
145. 532 F.2d 792 (Ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
146. Id at 793.
147. Id
148. 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976), stating that public financing of political campaigns "furthers,
not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values."
149. See Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See generally
Emerson, The Doctrine ofPrior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 648 (1955).
150. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976). But see Note, Freeing Public Broadcasting
from Unconstitutional Restraints, 89 YALE L.J. 719, 739 n.126 (1980), finding NEA funding
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A disappointed grant applicant cannot complain that his work has
been suppressed, but only that another's has been promoted in its
stead. The decision to withhold support is unavoidably based in
some part on the "subject matter" or "content" of expression, for the
very assumption of public funding of the arts is that decisions will be
made according to the literary or artistic worth of competing
applicants.
151
The plaintiffs conceded that such content-based decisions were neces-
sary, but asserted that "narrow standards and guidelines" were consti-
tutionally required to ensure that funding decisions were based on
artistic merit as opposed to personal preference or prejudice.15 2 The
court, however, found it "unwise to require an objective measure of
artistic merit... [i]n the absence of ascertainable principles by which
to define artistic merit."' 5 3 It did note in dicta that a claim of discrimi-
nation would be actionable:
The real danger in the injection of government money into the mar-
ketplace of ideas is that the market will be distorted by the promo-
tion of certain messages but not others. To some extent this danger is
tolerable because [sic] counterbalanced by the hope that public funds
will broaden the range of ideas expressed. But if the danger of dis-
tortion were to be evidenced by a pattern of discrimination imping-
ing [sic] on the basic first amendment right to free and full debate on
matters of public interest, a constitutional remedy would be
appropriate. '54
The Thomson case amply demonstrates the need for more admin-
istrative safeguards in the NEA's statutory funding structure. t55 The
First Circuit found the arbitrary treatment of the magazine in the
Thomson case "troubling,"'156 but absent any right to public subsidy,
decisions to be content-based determinations and thus prior restraints on expression, thereby
necessitating objective standards of evaluating artistic merit. See alro Comment, .upra note
144, at 1054.
151. 532 F.2d 792,795 (1st Cir. 1976). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYsTt OF FREEDOM
OF Exp.sSIoN 652 (1970); Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 565, 642-43
(1980).
152. 532 F.2d at 796. Plaintiffs were not asserting that the procedural safeguards appli-
cable to public places controlled in this situation. See, eg., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975), which requires discretionary official action regulating
expression in a municipal theater to be accompanied by "rigorous procedural safeguards."
Nonetheless, the Thomson Court rejected this argument, finding no tradition of neutrality in
government subsidization of expression, such as political campaigns. 532 F.2d at 796.
153. Id at 797.
154. Id at 798 (citations omitted).
155. See Shiffrin, supra note 151, at 646.47.
156. 532 F.2d at 797.
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the court doubted that a sufficient interest existed to claim a right to
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Procedural
safeguards, stated the court, would be of little value "given the ultimate
necessity of subjective judgment."' 57
Certainly, however, administrative procedural safeguards would
be of immense value to NEA grant applicants. The most important
concern is to ensure that only persons with an acknowledged expertise
in the arts make funding decisions. 58 Rejected grant applicants should
also have the opportunity to appeal their denial to a second, independ-
ent group of arts experts.' 5 9 Finally, the states and their respective arts
agencies must comply with these procedures in the disbursing of NEA
funds, in order to avoid another incident such as the one which in-
spired the Thomson decision.
160
III. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME PROPOSALS
This Note has demonstrated that direct and open government sup-
port of the performing arts, such as in West Germany, can be a more
viable solution from the standpoint of artistic freedom than indirect
support through the tax laws, assuming that the government is to be
involved at all. 161 Under the German system of government support,
the arts are less market oriented in terms of both donors and audiences
than in the United States. If artistic freedom is considered an objective
of a society 62 and one accepts that greater artistic freedom exists where
157. Id.
158. Other suggestions for improvement of the government funding structure include
shortening the terms of office for all members of the National Council and the Chairman,
with no opportunity to serve again. This would at least limit the effects of favoritism over
the long run. The Chairman should be elected by the National Council from their own
ranks for a very short term of office, for example, one or two years. rather than becoming a
political appointee of each incoming President. Restrictions on the Chairman's total deci-
sion-making authority and autonomy to insure against arbitrariness and favoritism, such as
a National Council veto power, would certainly be of value.
159. See supra notes 87, 144.
160. The lower court in Thomson noted that "[n]owhere in the statute is there any indica-
tion that the State agency's determination of merit is to be final and binding." Advocates for
Arts v. Thomson, 397 F. Supp. 1048, 1053 (D.N.H. 1975). Elimination of this statutory
loophole is an advisable precaution to avoid further instances of direct censorship by state
officials.
161. According to one West German legal scholar: "[O]ne of the paradoxes of our soci-
ety is that artistic freedom for the most part only allows itself to be realized when the state
not only occasionally, but continually and with considerable expense, promotes the arts."
Kewenig, supra note 49, at 96.
162. 20 U.S.C. § 951(5) (Supp. IV 1980) states that the United States government should




the arts are not considered competitive goods, then such insulation
from the market is desirable.
This attitude towards the arts explains in large part how German
jurisprudence has extracted a mandate for government support of the
arts from a constitutional guarantee of artistic freedom. At the same
time, the German system attempts to achieve insulation from govern-
ment influence in the arts by granting autonomy to the artistic leader-
ship of its public performing arts institutions. Though obviously
limited by budget considerations, this autonomy may be judicially en-
forced, and allows artistic directors to program the works they desire
during their tenure. Inevitably these artists program more contempo-
rary works than their American counterparts, not necessarily out of a
greater understanding of the importance of this part of their role as
artistic directors, but because of greater freedom to do so.
In the United States, the federal government indirectly subsidizes
performing arts institutions through the tax laws. Substantial influence
over the arts is thereby vested in private donors who are generally not
artists nor even persons with adequate expertise in the arts to make the
decisions crucial to maintaining the vitality of the arts. 63 The arts thus
tend to be elitist in the sense that the taste of the patrons who most
heavily contribute influences artistic trends.' Nothing indicates, how-
ever, that foundations' 65 or boards of trustees 6 6 are more qualified in
the arts or less likely to influence them than government officials.' 67
Further, they cannot be controlled by legal mechanisms.
This situation results from the lack of a tradition of government
support for the arts in the United States and a deep-seated concern over
government involvement with virtually any form of expression. But
163. "Vitality" in this sense is not used with regard to performance standards and prac-
tices, but in relation to the promotion of new works.
164. Price, supra note 101, at 1202, comments that the taste of the wealthy, therefore,
becomes that of the community.
165. D. NETZER, supra note 8, at 37.
166. P. HART, supra note 3, at 350.
167. W. BAUMOL & W. BowEs.N, supra note 8, at 375, state:
Indeed, one can make a strong case to the effect that interference by private pa-
trons is far more frequent and poses a far more imminent threat than does govern-
ment control. It has been charged more than once that some performing
organizations share the tribulations of the group "controlled by a handful of peo-
ple who consider the operation as their own private domain. They dictate not only
administrative policy, labor policy, fund raising policy, but public standards of
taste .. " We know of at least one case where a leading patron of an orchestral
group has virtually banned contemporary music. ... In such circumstances gov-
ernment support, instead of reducing the freedom of the arts, can serve to increase
it.
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perhaps the creative aspect of the performing arts does not thrive in the
"marketplace of ideas,"'' 6 8 at least on the commercial level. Even if one
refuses to accept a view of art as something to which the market is
inimical, it is arguably in the interest of society to protect the perform-
ing arts from such influences. The costs of performing a work of mod-
erate proportions is clearly beyond the resources of most individual
composers and playwrights. Thus, heavy reliance is placed on a mar-
ket of "culture consumers"'' 69 whose consumption is dominated by a
prediliction towards the slight percentage of older works which have
proven to be great works of art over time. The vitality of new creation
in the performing arts can only suffer.
The relatively recent arrival of direct subsidy in the United States,
through the National Endowment for the Arts and various state and
local arts agencies, merely channels additional money into the arts. It
does not fundamentally alter the situation of the performing arts be-
cause each agency functions as another consumer in the arts market. In
this regard, both German and American judicial opinions recognize the
necessity of discretionary, qualitative evaluations of artistic merit in the
distribution of funds to private institutions and individuals. Fortu-
nately, the NEA has largely avoided improperly influencing the arts,
and additional statutory procedural safeguards could ensure that only
artists and arts experts make funding decisions so as to protect the per-
forming arts from politicians and bureaucrats.
It is important to assess what the United States can learn and ap-
ply from the West German system, aside from suggestions for purely
administrative changes in the existing structure. According to a former
deputy chairman of the NEA, "More insidious than outright censor-
ship, because it is less visible, is the threat that government will come to
dominate the cultural life of the nation. ... 1o The West Germans
have certainly learned of the dangers of a centralized, coordinated cul-
168. See supra text accompanying note 154. In response to the "cultural populists," or
anti-elitists, whose opinions concerning the arts are prevalent in government circles, R. BttO-
STEIN, supra note 114, at 82, states:
[T]here is very little danger today that mass taste will go unsatisfied, if only be-
cause satisfying this taste is a source of enormous profit for a large number of
commercial entrepreneurs. No, the greater danger to a pluralistic society is that the
less popular, more unpalatable forms of creative expression will somehow whither
and die, partly because genuine works of art are not always accessible to large
audiences, being thought difficult, provocative, arcane, or experimental-at least,
at first.
169. See generally A. TOFFLER, supra note 101.
170. M. STRAIGHT, supra note 121, at 87. One House Report has stated that "the Arts
Endowment has recently made important strides to co-ordinate and consult with state arts
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tural policy from the Nazi experience. With this in mind, a wise course
for reform of the American direct subsidy system must involve the dis-
solution of the NEA as a grant-making body. Instead, federal appro-
priations should be administered by state and local arts agencies alone,
and they should be administered on an equitable basis to encourage
maximum cultural diversity. A federal statute, however, would be ad-
visable to ensure compliance with minimum standards for the adminis-
tration of funds. 7 '
More intriguing is the question of whether publicly owned per-
forming arts institutions are a viable solution to the current lack of ar-
tistic freedom in the performing arts in the United States. To be sure,
the West German system operates within a different legal and social
framework and is not free of imperfection, but the desirability of insu-
lating the repertory of the performing arts from commercialization re-
mains the same in both countries. Prevailing political attitudes
undoubtedly preclude the introduction of such a direct system of sup-
port on a significant scale in the United States. Nonetheless, states and
state arts councils should be encouraged to attempt such a program on
a modest basis.'72 Even a limited number of public institutions might
prove to be a significant step towards securing greater artistic freedom
in the performing arts in the United States and could serve as models
for emulation by other states in the future.
agencies concerning major policy decisions:' H.R. REP. No. 96-937, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
5512 (1980).
171. An important feature of such a statute would be to limit the class of grant recipients
to institutions, thereby dispersing government patronage power even further. See -rupra note
142. Rather than give equal block grants to the states, federal funds should be distributed in
proportion to a state's population.
172. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 561 (1975), which requires
"rigorous procedural safeguards" accompanying official discretion regarding the use of a
municipal theater, arguably would not preclude a public institution devoted to the perform-
ing arts where decisions were made by an autonomous artistic director. The Conrad case
involved a theater which was available generally for a multiplicity of purposes, including
"entertainment." 420 U.S. at 549 n.4.
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